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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000242

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/IET, EUR/NB, AND INR/EAP

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [EAID](#) [ASEC](#) [ID](#) [FI](#)

SUBJECT: ACEH TALKS: CONVERSATION WITH AHTISAARI'S OFFICE

REF: A. HELSINKI 228

[1](#)B. JAKARTA 2068 (NOTAL)

Classified By: POL Chief John Hall for reasons 1.4(B) and (D)

Summary and Action Request

[1](#)1. (C) On February 24, POL Chief and UK DCM met with Meeri-Maria Jaarva of former Finnish President Ahtisaari's staff for a more detailed read-out of the second round of the GoI-GAM talks held February 21-23 (Ref A). Jaarva described discussions in each of the agenda items, and said both sides have been charged with bringing written, concrete proposals to the next round, scheduled for April 12-17, and to be prepared to negotiate in detail. Ahtisaari and the GoI had wanted to hold the next meeting in March, but the GAM needs more time to prepare -- particularly because they are short of legal expertise. Jaarva was told by the GoI delegation that they are hoping for "something tangible" by July or August; she herself is uncertain whether that goal can be achieved, but is gratified that at least a process is under way.

[1](#)2. (C) Jaarva said that one area of special GAM concern is whether the TNI will go along with a GoI/GAM agreement; in this regard the GAM had said it is hoping that contacts between the TNI and the U.S. military can be used to help bind the armed forces to an agreement. Jaarva also mentioned that Ahtisaari's office needs financial support for the process: Ahtisaari's Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) currently pays for the transportation and hotel costs of the GAM delegation. We would appreciate the Department's advice as to whether the CMI might usefully approach a corporation with strong ties to Aceh, to ask for financial sponsorship. End Summary and Action Request.

Moving Forward on the Agenda

[1](#)3. (C) As reported Ref A, Jaarva said the GAM spent the first day stonewalling -- insisting on full independence for Aceh as the only possible outcome, and unwilling to tackle the point-by-point agenda of Ref B. By mid-afternoon of February 21, Ahtisaari realized that the talks were "going nowhere", so he adjourned for the day to give the GAM side a chance to consult internally. He also met separately with them Monday evening to urge a more constructive stance. On February 22, the GAM attitude was altogether different, and Ahtisaari was able to take both sides through the agenda. Jaarva gave us the following additional detail on the key items, which should be read in conjunction with Ref A:

-- Political parties: Jaarva said there was quite a long discussion on political participation, which collided with the fact that Indonesian law rules out formation of a political party that essentially has its strength in one province and which at most would represent two per cent of Indonesia's people. Ahtisaari has specifically charged the GoI with preparing a proposal during the inter-round break on how the GAM can play a political role within the framework of the Indonesian constitution. Jaarva said the CMI had earlier asked some Finnish legal experts to review the Special Autonomy law. Their analysis was sharply critical, said Jaarva, and Ahtisaari gave the GoI delegation a non-paper with their comments.

-- Human rights: The GAM is eager to see past injustices investigated, but Ahtisaari feels this is not the time to launch a truth and reconciliation process. He is counseling the GAM to hold back on that demand until a settlement has had a chance to take hold.

-- Amnesty/Reintegration of fighters: The GoI says it has prepared a draft amnesty law, which it will table in Round Three. There is also a GoI plan for providing some land to disarmed GAM fighters, but Ahtisaari has not seen the details.

-- Security: The GoI remains unwilling to discuss a ceasefire except as part of an overall settlement, and in any case Ahtisaari feels a ceasefire would be impossible to monitor at present. Decommissioning of GAM weapons remains to be sorted out -- as does disarming of government-supported militias.

The GoI apparently provided some figures on the extent to which TNI forces and paramilitaries would remain in the province.

-- Monitoring: Both sides agreed that both military and civilian monitors will be needed. The GoI suggested that ASEAN as an organization perform this task. Ahtisaari felt ASEAN "would not be credible enough" for the GAM, but suggested that ASEAN and the EU together might suffice. He left this thought (which he has already mentioned to Solana) for both sides to consider.

-- Timetable: The GoI apparently did not provide Ahtisaari with the level of detail discussed by VP Kalla in Ref B, but did say that they would like to see "something tangible" by July or August. They originally proposed that Round Three begin in March. The GAM argued that they needed more time to prepare, so the dates for the third round will be April 12-17. In particular, the GAM is short of legal expertise. Apparently their primary legal expert was in jail in Banda Aceh at the time of the tsunami, and was killed with all other inmates. A second legal advisor is still incarcerated. We commented to Jaarva that it might be a useful confidence-building measure for the GoI to release this person; she said the GAM had in fact asked for this but the GoI only reiterated that any amnesty provision must await the final settlement.

14. (C) Ahtisaari adjourned the round at midday on February 23, and charged both sides with preparing written proposals on each of the agenda items to bring to the table April 12, and to be ready for several days of detailed negotiation. Jaarva said that the Finns too wish the next round could take place in March, since something could happen in the meantime, but concede that the GAM needs a longer preparation time than does the GoI. Ahtisaari appealed to both sides to show restraint on the ground during the break.

15. (C) Summing up, Jaarva said, "I wouldn't bet much money yet -- especially my own -- that there will be an agreement by July or August. But at least there's a process going on now." Asked whether Ahtisaari feels both sides are negotiating in good faith, Jaarva answered with a cautious yes. A question more difficult to answer is whether the GAM negotiators represent only their own people, or wider Aceh society. There was some discussion at the table of engaging the Acehnese as a whole in the process, she said, but the GoI shied away from anything that might resemble a referendum.

16. (C) Jaarva said one troubling question from Ahtisaari's point of view is whether the TNI can be counted on to go along with a settlement. MGEN Tippe was a member of the GoI delegation and participated in the government side's internal deliberations, but not in the talks at the table. She said the GAM fears that the TNI will become a third party to the negotiations. Ahtisaari hopes that U.S.-Indonesian military cooperation will help "bind" the TNI to an internationally-accepted agreement. A second, more prosaic problem is the cost of these talks. The CMI is only a small office with a limited budget, and currently is funding the transportation and hotel costs for the GAM side. (The Government of Finland provides the manor house in which the talks are held, and meals served there.) Ahtisaari's staff will spend part of the break hunting for financial assistance.

17. (C) We asked whether the presence of Kingsbury and other foreign activists had hindered the negotiations. As reported Ref A, Jaarva said that Ahtisaari had allowed these visitors onto the grounds of the estate, but had denied them permission to join the talks. At first the GoI side was unhappy about the activists, but Ahtisaari made the point to the government delegation that these people were not participating in the talks -- and besides, the GoI had jailed some Acehnese whom the GAM might have wanted to bring instead. For his part, Ahtisaari was concerned that Kingsbury was "quite talkative to the press," but on balance the presence of the activists may have been positive: Jaarva said that Ahtisaari now suspects they did play a role in bringing about the GAM delegation's change of attitude on the night of February 21.

Delegations  
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18. (SBU) Jaarva provided this list of the two delegations. All spellings and titles are as received from her.

-- Government --

Supervisor of the delegation:  
Mr. Adi Sudjipto Widodo, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs  
Delegation:  
- Mr. Hamid Awaluddin, Minister for Justice and Human Rights, Chairman of delegation  
- Mr. Sofyan Djalil, Minister for Communications and Information

- Mr. Farid Husain, Deputy Minister for Social Welfare
- Mr. I. Gusti Agung Wesaka Pudja, Director for Human Rights and Security, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Usman Basyah, Deputy III Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Department of National Security

In addition to the official delegation:

- Major-General Syarifuddin Tippe, TNI

-- GAM --

- Mr. Malik Mahmud
- Dr. Zaini Abdullah
- Mr. Bakhtiar Abdullah
- Mr. M. Nur Djuli
- Mr. Nurdin Abdul Rahman

In addition to the delegation:

- Mr. Teuku Hadi
- Dr. Damien Kingsbury
- Dr. Vacy Vlazna
- Mr. Muzakkir Abdul Hamid

WEISBERG